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Abstract
Cooperative behavior, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a wide
spread phenomenon. Here we study direct reciprocity in the context of the alternating
Prisoner’s Dilemma. We consider all strategies that can be implemented by one and two-
state automata. We calculate the payoff matrix of all pairwise encounters in the presence
of noise. We explore deterministic selection dynamics with and without mutation. Using
different error rates and payoff values, we observe convergence to a small number of distinct
equilibria. Two of them are uncooperative strict Nash equilibria representing always-defect
(ALLD) and Grim. The third equilibrium is mixed and represents a cooperative alliance
of several strategies, dominated by a strategy which we call Forgiver. Forgiver cooperates
whenever the opponent has cooperated; it defects once when the opponent has defected,
but subsequently Forgiver attempts to re-establish cooperation even if the opponent has
defected again. Forgiver is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, but the alliance, which it
rules, is asymptotically stable. For a wide range of parameter values the most commonly
observed outcome is convergence to the mixed equilibrium, dominated by Forgiver. Our
results show that although forgiving might incur a short-term loss it can lead to a long-term
gain. Forgiveness facilitates stable cooperation in the presence of exploitation and noise.
A cooperative dilemma arises when two cooperators receive a higher payoff than two defec-
tors and yet there is an incentive to defect [1,2]. The Prisoner’s Dilemma [3–9] is the strongest
form of a cooperative dilemma, where cooperation requires a mechanism for its evolution [10].
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions
between the same two individuals [11–36]. The standard theory assumes that both players de-
cide simultaneously what do for the next round. But another possibility is that the players take
turns when making their moves [37–39]. This implementation can lead to a strictly alternating
game, where the players always chose their moves in turns, or a stochastically alternating game,
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where in each round the player to move next is selected probabilistically. Here we investigate
the strictly alternating game.
We consider the following scenario. In each round a player can pay a cost, c, for the other
player to receive a benefit, b, where b > c > 0. If both players cooperate in two consecutive
moves, each one gets b− c, which is greater than the zero payoff they would receive for mutual
defection. But if one player defects, while the other cooperates, then the defector gets payoff,
b, while the cooperator gets the lowest payoff, −c. Therefore, over two consecutive moves the
payoff structure is the same as in a Prisoner’s Dilemma: b > b− c > 0 > −c. Thus, this game
is an alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma [38].
We study the strictly alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of noise [16, 20, 40].
In each round, a player makes a mistake with probability  leading to the opposite move.
We consider all strategies that can be implemented by deterministic finite state automata [41]
with one or two states. Finite state automata have been used extensively to study repeated
games [40, 42–44] including the simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma. In our case, each state is
labeled by C or D. In state C the player will cooperate in the next move; in state D the
player will defect. Each strategy starts in one of those two states. Each state has two outgoing
transitions (either to the same or to the other state): one transition specifies what happens if
the opponent has cooperated (labeled with c) and one if the opponent has defected (labeled
with d). There are 26 automata encoding unique strategies (Fig. 1). These strategies include
ALLC, ALLD, Grim, tit-for-tat (TFT), and win-stay lose-shift (WSLS).
We can divide these 26 strategies into four categories: (i) sink-state C (ssC) strategies,
(ii) sink-state D (ssD) strategies, (iii) suspicious dynamic strategies, and (iv) hopeful dynamic
strategies. Sink-state strategies always-cooperate or always-defect either from the beginning
or after some condition is met. They include ALLC, ALLD, Grim and variations of them.
There are eight sink-state strategies in total. Suspicious dynamic strategies start with defection
and then move between their defective and cooperative state depending on the other player’s
decision. Hopeful dynamic strategies do the same, but start with cooperation. There are nine
strategies in each of these two categories. For each suspicious dynamic strategy there is a
hopeful counterpart.
Some of the dynamic strategies do little to optimize their score. For example, Alternator
(S22; see Fig. 1 for strategy names and their indexing) switches between cooperation and
defection on each move. But a subset of dynamic strategies are of particular interest: Forgiver
(S14), TFT (S15), WSLS (S16) and their suspicious counterparts (S4, S8, and S12). These
strategies have the design element to stay in state C if the opponent has cooperated in the last
round but move to state D if the opponent has defected:
C D
c
d
(1)
We call this element (1) the conditional cooperation element. TFT then requires the opponent
to cooperate again in order to move back to the cooperative state. WSLS in contrast requires
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the opponent to defect in order to move back to the cooperative state. But Forgiver moves back
to the cooperative state irrespective of the opponents move (Fig. 1: hopeful dynamic strategies).
Neither TFT nor WSLS are error correcting in the alternating game [38]. In a game between
two TFT players, if by mistake one of them starts to defect, they will continue to defect
until another mistake happens. The same is true for WSLS in the alternating game. In the
simultaneous game TFT is also not error correcting [18], while WSLS is error correcting [19].
Thus WSLS, which is known to be a strong strategy in the simultaneous game, is not expected
to do well in the alternating game. Forgiver, on the other hand, is error correcting in the
alternating game. It recovers from an accidental defection in three rounds (Fig. 2).
Results
We calculate the payoff for all pairwise encounters in games of L moves of both strategies,
thereby obtaining a 26× 26 payoff matrix. We average over which strategy goes first. Without
loss of generality we set c = 1. At first we study the case b = 3 with error rate  = 0.05 and
game length L = 100. Table 1 shows a part of the calculated payoff matrix for six relevant
strategies. We find that ALLD (S1) and Grim (S17) are the only strict Nash equilibria among
the 26 pure strategies. ALLC (S26) vs ALLC receives a high payoff, but so does Forgiver vs
Forgiver. The payoffs of WSLS vs WSLS and TFT vs TFT are low, because neither strategy
is error correcting (Fig. 2). Interestingly TFT vs WSLS yields good payoff for both strategies,
because their interaction is error correcting.
In the following, we study evolutionary game dynamics [45–47] with the replicator equation.
The frequency of strategy Si is denoted by xi. At any one time we have
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, where
n = 26 is the number of strategies. The frequency xi changes according to the relative payoff
of strategy Si. We evaluate evolutionary trajectories for many different initial frequencies. The
trajectories start from 104 uniformly distributed random points in the 26-simplex.
Typically, we do not find convergence to one of the strict Nash equilibria (Fig. 3b). In only
5% of the cases the trajectories converge to the pure ALLD equilibrium and in 18% of the
cases the trajectories converge to the pure Grim equilibrium. However, in 77% of the cases we
observe convergence to a mixed equilibrium of several strategies, dominated by Forgiver with a
population share of 82.6% (Fig. 3b). The other six strategies present in this cooperative alliance
are Paradoxic Grateful (S5; population share of 3.2%), Grateful (S9; 5.6%), Suspicious ALLC
ALLD Forgiver TFT WSLS Grim ALLC
ALLD 10.0 148.4 24.8 144.9 11.5 280.0
Forgiver -36.1 174.8 163.5 166.9 -12.7 194.3
TFT 5.1 178.1 104.5 176.7 24.5 194.5
WSLS -35.0 169.1 162.3 106.5 -12.0 230.9
Grim 9.5 152.0 40.5 148.8 28.1 262.9
ALLC -80.0 177.2 176.6 67.3 -28.8 190.0
Table 1: Excerpt of the payoff matrix with the most relevant strategies when the benefit value b = 3 (c = 1),
the error rate  = 5%, and the number of rounds in each game L = 100. There are two pure Nash equilibria
in the full payoff matrix: ALLD (S1) and Grim (S17), both denoted in red.
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(S13; 3.8%), and ALLC (S26; 0.3%), all of which have a sink-state C, and TFT (S15; 4.1%)
and WSLS (S16; 0.4%), which are the remaining two dynamic strategies with the conditional
cooperation element.
When increasing the benefit value to b = 4 and b = 5, we observe convergence to a very
similar alliance (Fig. 3c and 3d). For b = 2, however, the ssC (sink-state C) strategies (S5, S9,
S13, S26) and WSLS are replaced by Grim and the mixed equilibrium is formed by Forgiver,
TFT, and Grim (Fig. 3a). Very rarely we observe convergence to a cooperative alliance led by
Suspicious Forgiver (S12; for short, sForgiver). It turns out that for some parameter values the
Suspicious Forgiver alliance is an equilibrium (see Supplementary Information).
From the 104 random initial frequencies, the four equilibria were reached in the following
proportions (using  = 0.05 and L = 100):
ALLD Grim Forgiver sForgiver
b = 2 15% 52% 33% <1%
b = 3 5% 18% 77% 0%
b = 4 2% 7% 90% 1%
b = 5 1% 3% 93% 3%.
Changing the error rate,  = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 and the number of rounds per game, L = 10,
100, 1000, we find very similar behavior. Only the frequencies of the strategies within the mixed
equilibria change marginally but not the general equilibrium composition (Fig. 4). Though,
there is one exception. When the probability for multiple errors within an entire match becomes
very low (e.g., L = 10 and  = 0.05 or L = 100 and  = 0.01) and b > 2, the payoff of ALLC
against Grim can become higher than the payoff of Grim against itself. In other words, Grim
can be invaded by ALLC. Hence, instead of the pure Grim equilibrium we observe a mixed
equilibrium between Grim and ALLC (Supplementary Information).
We check the robustness of the observed equilibria by incorporating mutation to the repli-
cator equation. We find that both the ALLD and the rare Suspicious Forgiver equilibrium are
unstable. In the presence of mutation the evolutionary trajectories lead away from ALLD to
Grim and from Suspicious Forgiver to Forgiver (see Supplementary Information). The Grim
equilibrium and the Forgiver equilibrium remain stable.
Essential is that Forgiver can resist invasion by ssD strategies (S1, S17, S21, S25), because
Forgiver does better against itself than the ssD strategies do against Forgiver (Table 1). How-
ever, Forgiver can be invaded by ssC strategies and TFT. But, since TFT performs poorly
against itself and ssC strategies are exploited by WSLS (Table 1), all these strategies can coex-
ist in the Forgiver equilibrium. More detailed results and equilibrium analysis for a wide range
of parameter values for  and L are provided in the Supplementary Information.
In the case of an infinitely repeated game we can derive analytical results for the average
payoff per round for the most relevant strategy pairs (Table 2). From these results we obtain
that ALLD (or ssD strategies) cannot invade Forgiver if
b
c
>
2 + − 2
1− 2 . (2)
This result holds for any error rate, , between 0 and 1/2 (Fig. 4d).
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Discussion
Our results imply an indisputable strength of the strategy Forgiver in the alternating Prisoner’s
Dilemma in the presence of noise. For a wide range of parameter values, Forgiver is the domi-
nating strategy of the cooperative equilibrium, having a population share of more than half in
all investigated scenarios.
Essential for the success of a cooperative strategy in the presence of noise is how fast it
can recover back to cooperation after a mistake, but at the same time, also avoid excessive
exploitation by defectors. The conditional cooperation element (1) is crucial for the triumph
of Forgiver. Even though, also TFT and WSLS contain this element, which allows them to
cooperate against cooperative strategies without getting excessively exploited by defectors, these
strategies are not as successful as Forgiver, because of their inability to correct errors. Grim also
possesses this conditional cooperation element. However, noise on the part of Grim’s opponent
will inevitably cause Grim to switch to always-defect. It is Grim’s ability to conditionally
cooperate for the first handful of turns that provides a competitive advantage over pure ALLD
such that the strict Nash equilibrium ALLD can only rarely arise.
The other strategies appearing in the Forgiver equilibrium for the cases of b = 3, b = 4,
and b = 5 are Paradoxic Grateful (S5), Grateful (S9), Suspicious ALLC (S13), and ALLC
(S26). All of them are ssC strategies that, in the presence of noise, behave like ALLC after the
first few moves. The strategy ALLC does very well in combination with Forgiver. Nevertheless,
ALLC itself appears rarely. Perhaps because of Paradoxic Grateful, which defects against ALLC
for many moves in the beginning, whereas Suspicious ALLC puts Paradoxic Grateful into its
cooperating state immediately. One might ask why these ssC strategies do not occupy a larger
population share in the cooperative equilibrium. The reason is the presence of exploitative
strategies like WSLS which itself is a weak strategy in this domain. If only Forgiver was
present, WSLS would be quickly driven to extinction; WSLS does worse against itself and
Forgiver than Forgiver does against WSLS and itself (see Table 1). But WSLS remains in
the Forgiver equilibrium because it exploits the ssC strategies. Interestingly, higher error rates
increase the population share of unconditional cooperators (ssC strategies) in the cooperative
equilibrium (Fig. 4c). Simultaneously, the higher error rates can decrease the probability to
converge to the cooperative equilibrium dramatically and hence prevent the evolution of any
cooperative behavior (Fig. 4a).
Grim and Forgiver are similar strategies, the difference being, in the face of a defection,
Forgiver quickly returns to cooperation whereas Grim never returns. An interesting interpre-
tation of the relationship is that Grim never forgives while Forgiver always does. Thus, the
ALLD Forgiver ALLC
ALLD  · (b− c) b · 1−22− −  · c b−  · (b+ c)
Forgiver  · b− c · 1−22− (b− c) · 1+
2·(1−)
1+3−2 b · (1− )− c · 1−·(1−)1+
ALLC  · b− c · (1− ) b · 1−+21+ − c · (1− ) (b− c)(1− )
Table 2: Analytical results of the average payoff per round in the infinitely alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma
for ALLD (S1), Forgiver (S14), and ALLC (S26) playing against each other. Derivations are provided in the
Supplementary Information.
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clash between Grim and Forgiver is actually a test of the viability of forgiveness under various
conditions. On the one hand, the presence of noise makes forgiveness powerful and essential. On
the other hand, if cooperation is not valuable enough, forgiveness can be exploited. Moreover,
even when cooperation is valuable, but the population is ruled by exploiters, forgiveness is not
a successful strategy. Given the right conditions, forgiveness makes cooperation possible in the
face of both exploitation and noise.
These results demonstrate a game-theoretic foundation for forgiveness as a means of pro-
moting cooperation. If cooperation is valuable enough, it can be worth forgiving others for
past wrongs in order to gain future benefit. Forgiving incurs a short-term loss but ensures
a greater long-term gain. Given all the (intentional or unintentional) misbehavior in the real
world, forgiveness is essential for maintaining healthy, cooperative relationships.
Methods
Strategy space. We consider deterministic finite automata [41] (DFA) with one and two
states. There are two one-state automata which encode the strategies always-defect (ALLD)
and always-cooperate (ALLC). In total, there are 32 two-state automata encoding strategies
in our game: two possible arrangements of states (CD, DC) and 16 possible arrangements
of transitions per arrangement of states. For 8 of these 32 automata, the second state is not
reachable, making them indistinguishable from a one-state automata. Since we already added
the one-state automata to our strategy space, these 8 can be ignored. The remaining 24 two-
state automata encode distinct strategies in our game. Hence, in total we have 26 deterministic
strategies in the alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma (Fig. 1).
Generation of the payoff matrix. In each round of the game a player can either coop-
erate or defect. Cooperation means paying a cost, c, for the other player to receive a benefit, b.
Defection means paying no cost and distributing no benefit. Thus, summing over two consecu-
tive moves (equivalent to one round) we obtain the following payoff matrix:
C D
C b− c, b− c −c, b
D b, −c 0, 0 .
If b > c > 0, the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma since the following inequalities are satisfied:
b > b−c > 0 > −c and 2(b−c) > b−c. In other words, in a single round it is best to defect, but
cooperation might be fruitful when playing over multiple rounds. The second inequality ensures
that sustained cooperation results in a higher payoff than alternation between cooperation and
defection.
For each set of parameters (number of rounds L, error rate , benefit value b, and costs c),
we generate a 26 × 26 payoff matrix A where each of the 26 distinct strategies is paired with
each other. The entry aij in the payoff matrix A gives the payoff of strategy Si playing against
strategy Sj . Based on the average of which strategy (player) goes first, we define the initial
state distribution of both players as a row vector QSi×Sj . Since the players do not observe when
they have made a mistake (i.e., the faulty player does not move to the corresponding state of
the erroneous action which he has accidentally played), the state space consists of sixteen states
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namely CC, CD, DC, DD, D∗C, D∗D, C∗C, C∗D, CD∗, · · · C∗C∗. The star after a state
indicates that the player accidentally played the opposite move as intended by her current state.
Each game consists of exactly L moves of both player. In each move, a player makes a
mistake with probability  and thus implements the opposite move of what is specified by her
strategy (automaton). We denote 1 −  by ¯. Although, the players do not observe their
mistakes, the payoffs depend on the actual moves. The payoffs corresponding to their moves in
the different states are given by the column vector U .
Next, we define a 16 × 16 transition matrix MSi×Sj for each pair of strategies Si, Sj . The
entries of the transition matrix are given by the probabilities to move from one state to the
next:
MSi×Sj =

p1p
′
1¯
2 p1(1− p′1)¯2 (1− p1)p′1¯2 · · · (1− p1)(1− p′1)2
p2p
′
3¯
2 . . .
...
p3p
′
2¯
2
...
. . .
...
p3p
′
3¯
2 · · · · · · (1− p3)(1− p′3)2

(3)
where the quadruple [38] (p1, p2, p3, p4) defines the probabilities of strategy Si to cooperate in the
observed states CC, CD, DC, and DD (errors remain undetected by the players). Respectively,
the quadruple (p′1, p′2, p′3, p′4) encodes the strategy Sj . For example, (1−p4)p3¯ is the probability
to move from state DD to state C∗C. A deterministic strategy is represented as a quadruple
where each pl ∈ {0, 1}.
Using the initial state distribution QSi×Sj , the transition matrix MSi×Sj , and the payoff
vector U , we calculate the payoff aij of strategy Si playing against strategy Sj via a Markov
Chain:
aij = QSi×Sj ×
L−1∑
k=0
MkSi×Sj × U . (4)
Applying equation (4) to each pair of strategies, we obtain the entire payoff matrix A for a given
set of parameter values. Although we use deterministic strategies, the presence of noise implies
that the game that unfolds between any two strategies is described by a stochastic process.
Payoff matrices for benefit values of b = 2, b = 3, b = 4, and b = 5, for error rates of  = 0.01,
 = 0.05, and  = 0.1, and for game length of L = 10, L = 100, and L = 1000 are provided in
the Supplementary Information.
Evolution of strategies. The strategy space spans a 26-simplex which we explore via the
replicator equation [45–47] with and without mutations. The frequency of strategy Si is given
by xi. At any time
∑n
i=1 xi = 1 holds where n = 26 is the number of strategies. The average
payoff (fitness) for strategy Si is given by
fi =
n∑
j=1
aijxj . (5)
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The frequency of strategy Si changes according to the differential equation
x˙i = xi(fi − f¯) + u
(
1
n
− xi
)
(6)
where the average population payoff is f¯ =
∑n
i=1 fixi and u is the mutation rate. Using the
differential equation (6), defined on the n-simplex (here, n = 26), we study the evolutionary
dynamics in the alternating Prisoner’s dilemma for many different initial conditions (i.e., random
initial frequencies of the strategies). We generate a uniform-random point in the n-simplex by
taking the negative logarithm of n random numbers in (0, 1), then normalizing these numbers
such that they sum to 1, and using the normalized values as the initial frequencies of the n
strategies [48].
Computer simulations. Our computer simulations are implemented in Python and split
into three programs. The first program generates the 26 × 26 payoff matrix for each set of
parameters. The second program simulates the deterministic selection dynamics starting from
uniform-random points in the 26-simplex. The third program performs statistical analysis on
the results of the second program. The code is available upon request.
References
[1] Hauert, C., Michor, F., Nowak, M. A. & Doebeli, M. Synergy and discounting of coopera-
tion in social dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 239, 195–202 (2006).
[2] Nowak, M. A. Evolving cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 299, 1–8 (2012).
[3] Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. M. Prisoner’s dilemma (University of Michigan Press,
1965).
[4] Trivers, R. L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly review of biology 46, 35–57
(1971).
[5] Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
[6] May, R. M. More evolution of cooperation. Nature 327, 15–17 (1987).
[7] Milinski, M. Tit for tat in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. Nature 325,
433–435 (1987).
[8] Sigmund, K. Games of life: explorations in ecology, evolution and behavior (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 1993).
[9] Clutton-Brock, T. Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies. Nature 462, 51–57
(2009).
[10] Nowak, M. A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
[11] Aumann, R. J. Survey of repeated games. In Essays in game theory and mathematical
economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern, 11–42 (Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim,
1981).
8
[12] Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with
incomplete information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 54, 533–554
(1986).
[13] Abreu, D. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 56,
383–396 (1988).
[14] Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. Pavlov and the prisoner’s dilemma. Theory and Decision 26,
47–79 (1989).
[15] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 137, 21–26 (1989).
[16] Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games. The
American Economic Review 80, 274–279 (1990).
[17] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner’s
dilemma. Acta Applicandae Mathematicae 20, 247–265 (1990).
[18] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355,
250–253 (1992).
[19] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat
in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature 364, 56–58 (1993).
[20] Wu, J. & Axelrod, R. How to cope with noise in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal
of Conflict Resolution 39, 183–189 (1995).
[21] Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. Evolution of learning among pavlov strategies in a competitive
environment with noise. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, 439–466 (1995).
[22] Cressman, R. Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
Journal of Economic Theory 68, 234–248 (1996).
[23] Boerlijst, M. C., Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Equal pay for all prisoners. American
Mathematical Monthly 104, 303–305 (1997).
[24] Milinski, M. & Wedekind, C. Working memory constrains human cooperation in the pris-
oners dilemma. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 95, 13755–13758 (1998).
[25] Kraines, D. P. & Kraines, V. Y. Natural selection of memory-one strategies for the iterated
prisoners dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology 203, 335–355 (2000).
[26] Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C. & Fudenberg, D. Emergence of cooperation and
evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646–650 (2004).
[27] Dal Bo´, P. Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from
infinitely repeated games. The American Economic Review 95, 1591–1604 (2005).
9
[28] Doebeli, M. & Hauert, C. Models of cooperation based on the prisoner’s dilemma and the
snowdrift game. Ecology Letters 8, 748–766 (2005).
[29] Kendall, G., Yao, X. & Chong, S. Y. The Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma: 20 Years on (World
Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., 2007).
[30] Sigmund, K. The calculus of selfishness (Princeton University Press, 2009).
[31] Imhof, L. A. & Nowak, M. A. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity.
Proceedings of the Royal Society 277, 463–468 (2010).
[32] Fudenberg, D., Rand, D. G. & Dreber, A. Slow to anger and fast to forgive: cooperation
in an uncertain world. American Economic Review 102, 720–749 (2012).
[33] van Veelen, M., Garc´ıa, J., Rand, D. G. & Nowak, M. A. Direct reciprocity in structured
populations. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109, 9929–9934 (2012).
[34] Press, W. H. & Dyson, F. J. Iterated prisoners dilemma contains strategies that dominate
any evolutionary opponent. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109, 10409–10413 (2012).
[35] Hilbe, C., Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. The evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner’s
dilemma games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 110, 6913–6918 (2013).
[36] Stewart, A. J. & Plotkin, J. B. From extortion to generosity, the evolution of zero-
determinant strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma. q-bio (2013). URL http://arxiv.
org/abs/1304.7205v2.
[37] Wedekind, C. & Milinski, M. Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating
prisoner’s dilemma: Pavlov versus generous tit-for-tat. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 93, 2686–
2689 (1996).
[38] Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. The alternating prisoners dilemma. Journal of Theoretical
Biology 168, 219–226 (1994).
[39] Frean, M. R. The prisoner’s dilemma without synchrony. Proceedings of the Royal Society
of London 257, 75–79 (1994).
[40] Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K. & El-Sedy, E. Automata, repeated games and noise. Journal
of Mathematical Biology 33, 703–722 (1995).
[41] Hopcroft, J. E., Motwani, R. & Ullman, J. D. Introduction to Automata Theory, Languages,
and Computation (Prentice Hall, 2006), 3rd edn.
[42] Rubinstein, A. Finite automata play the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic
Theory 39, 83–96 (1986).
[43] Miller, J. H. The coevolution of automata in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 29, 87–112 (1996).
10
[44] Binmore, K. G. & Samuelson, L. Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite
automata. Journal of Economic Theory 57, 278–305 (1992).
[45] Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Mathemat-
ical Aspects of Selection. (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
[46] Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
[47] Weibull, J. W. Evolutionary Game Theory (The MIT press, 1995).
[48] Devroye, L. Non-uniform random variate generation, vol. 4 (Springer-Verlag New York,
1986).
11
Suspicious dynamic strategies
S2
D C
c
d
c, d
Suspicious Paradoxic (S3)
D C
c
d
c
d
Suspicious WSLS (S4)
D C
c
d
d
c
S6
D C
d
c
c, d
S7
D C
d
c
c
d
Suspicious TFT (S8)
D C
d
c
d
c
Suspicious Alternator (S10)
D C
c, d
c, d
S11
D C
d
c, d
c
Suspicious Forgiver (S12)
D C
c, d
d
c
Hopeful dynamic strategies
Forgiver (S14)
C D
c
d
c, d
TFT (S15)
C D
c
d
c
d
WSLS (S16)
C D
c
d
d
c
S18
C D
d
c
c, d
S19
C D
d
c
c
d
Paradoxic (S20)
C D
d
c
d
c
Alternator (S22)
C D
c, d
c, d
S23
C D
c, d
c
d
S24
C D
c, d
d
c
Sink-state C strategies
ALLC (S26)
C
c, d
Paradoxic Grateful (S5)
D C
c
d
c, d
Grateful (S9)
D C
d
c
c, d
Suspicious ALLC (S13)
D C
c, d
c, d
Grim (S17)
C D
c
d
c, d
Paradoxic Grim (S21)
C D
d
c
c, d
Hopeful ALLD (S25)
C D
c, d
c, d
ALLD (S1)
D
c, d
Sink-state D strategies
Figure 1: Deterministic strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The 26 distinct strategies (automata) are classified into four
categories: (i) sink-state C strategies, (ii) sink-state D strategies, (iii) suspicious dynamic strategies, and (iv) hopeful dynamic
strategies. The automata with the blue background shading contain a conditional cooperation element which ensures the benefit
of mutual cooperation but also avoids being exploited by defection-heavy strategies.
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Figure 2: Performance of the conditional cooperators in the presence of noise. An asterisk after a move indicates that
this move was caused by an error. When the conditional cooperators are playing against a copy of themselves, Forgiver performs
very well as it can recover from an accidental defection within three rounds. Against defection-heavy strategies like Grim and
ALLD, Forgiver gets exploited in each second round. Both TFT and WSLS are not error correcting as they are unable to recover
back to cooperation after an unintentional mistake. Only another mistake can enable them to return to cooperative behavior.
When Grim plays against itself and a single defection occurs, it moves to the defection state with no possibility of returning to
cooperation.
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Figure 3: The evolution of strategies in the alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma. In all panels, the simulations start from
some random point in the 26-simplex. The error rate  is set to 5%, the number of rounds per game is L = 100, and the
mutation rate is u = 0. The evolutionary trajectories converge to a cooperative alliance of many strategies dominated by the
strategy Forgiver.
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Figure 4: Robustness of results across various benefit values and error rates. a | Convergence probability to the Forgiver
equilibrium of a uniform-random point in the 26-simplex. Note that for higher error rates (increasing noise-level), the probability
to converge to the cooperative equilibrium is much lower. b | Population share of Forgiver (S14) in the Forgiver equilibrium.
Observe the relationship between the higher error rates and the lower population share of Forgiver. c | Population share of sink-
state C strategies (S5, S9, S13, S26) in the Forgiver equilibrium. Higher error rates lead to higher proportions of unconditional
cooperators. d | In the infinitely repeated game, for all value pairs of b/c and  in the blue shaded area, ALLD cannot invade
Forgiver since the average payoff of Forgiver playing against itself is higher than the average payoff of ALLD against Forgiver
(see Inequality (2)).
